Zayed University

ZU Scholars
All Works
5-5-2016

From Black Bile to the Bipolar Spectrum: A Historical Review of
the Bipolar Affective Disorder Concept
Justin Thomas
Zayed University

Ian Grey
Zayed University

Follow this and additional works at: https://zuscholars.zu.ac.ae/works
Part of the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas, Justin and Grey, Ian, "From Black Bile to the Bipolar Spectrum: A Historical Review of the Bipolar
Affective Disorder Concept" (2016). All Works. 1725.
https://zuscholars.zu.ac.ae/works/1725

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ZU Scholars. It has been accepted for inclusion in All
Works by an authorized administrator of ZU Scholars. For more information, please contact
Yrjo.Lappalainen@zu.ac.ae, nikesh.narayanan@zu.ac.ae.

Archives of Depression and Anxiety
Justin Thomas* and Ian Grey

Review Article

Department of Natural Science and Public Health,
Zayed University, PO Box 144534, Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates

From Black Bile to the Bipolar
Spectrum: A Historical Review of the
Bipolar Affective Disorder Concept

Dates: Received: 03 March, 2016; Accepted: 04
May, 2016; Published: 05 May, 2016
*Corresponding author: Dr Justin Thomas,
Associate Professor, Department of Natural Science
and Public Health at Zayed University, United Arab
Emirates, E-mail:
www.peertechz.com
ISSN: 2455-5460

The Classical Period
The terms melancholia and mania have their etymologies in
classical Greek. Melancholia is derived from ‘melas’ (black) and
‘chole’ (bile), highlighting the term’s origins in pre-Hippocratic
humoral theories [1]. Where depression/melancholia was viewed as
an excess of black bile, the humoral perspective saw mania as arising
from an excess of yellow bile [2], or a mixture of excessive black and
yellow bile [3]. The exact origins of the term mania however, are not
as clear-cut as those outlined for melancholia. The Roman physician,
Caelius Aurelianus, proposes several origins for the word mania,
including the Greek word ‘ania’, meaning to produce great mental
anguish. He also suggests ‘manos’, meaning relaxed or loose, which
would approximate to an excessive relaxing of the mind or soul [4].
There are at least five other etymological candidates proposed by
Aurelianus for the word mania and the confusion surrounding the
exact etymology is attributed to its varied usage in the pre-Hippocratic
poetry and mythologies [4].
The earliest existent conceptualisations of mania and depression
(melancholia) as human ailments are found in the works of the Greek
philosophers and physicians of the classical period. Primacy for the
earliest systematic descriptions are typically attributed to Hippocrates
(460 – 337 BC) [5]. It is important to note however, that in the classical
conceptualisations of mania and melancholia the two entities are
never explicitly related; there is no mention of an integrated manicmelancholic illness concept.

Arataeus of Cappadocia
The idea of a possible relationship between mania and
melancholia is first alluded to in the 2nd century AD by Soranus
of Ephedrus (98-177 AD). Soranus himself describes mania and
melancholia as distinct diseases with separate aetiologies, however,
he acknowledges that “many others consider melancholia a form of
the disease of mania” [6]. For direct and unequivocal speculations
about a relationship between mania and melancholia we must look to
Arataeus of Cappadocia. Arataeus, an eclectic medical philosopher,
living in Alexandria between 30 and 150 AD, is recognized as having
authored most of the surviving texts referring to a unified concept
of a manic-depressive illness [7]. Operating within the humoural
paradigm, Arataeus viewed both melancholia and mania as having

a common origin in excessive ‘black bile’ [7,8]. Furthermore, he
connected the concepts, viewing them –mania and melancholia - as
different aspects of the same illness with mania conceptualized as
being an end stage of melancholia [4,5,8]. In his “On Etiology and
Symptomatology of Chronic Illnesses”, Arataeus writes:
“… I think that melancholia is the beginning and a part of mania…
The development of a mania is really a worsening of the disease
[Melancholia] rather than a change into another disease…In most of
them [melancholics] the sadness became better after various lengths of
time and changed into happiness; the patients then developed mania.”
[4].
And also: “… the melancholia increases and becomes mania.” [8]
The writings of Arataeus represent the earliest known written
record of the birth of the bipolar disorder / manic depressive illness
concept. His ideas resonate with the manic-depressive illness concepts
of more recent centuries. For example, Arataeus’ description of the
transformation of depression into mania aligns with the ‘manic
defence hypothesis’. This is an idea detailed by psychoanalytic writers,
contending that mania is an extreme defence against, or reaction to,
depression (Abraham, 1911/1927; Dooley, 1921; Rado, 1928). This
is an idea that has, in more recent years, received empirical support
through the work of contemporary experimental psychologists
(Bentall & Thompson, 1990; Neale, 1988; Thomas & Bentall, 2002;
Winters & Neale, 1985).
Arataeus’ bipolar concept also included the idea of predisposing
traits, suggesting individuals who developed mania were
characteristically labile, irritable, angry or happy. Conversely,
those who only developed melancholia were viewed as tending
towards depression in their pre-morbid state (Zax & Cowen, 1976).
Arataeus ultimately saw emotional disorders as magnifications or
exaggerations of existing character traits, another idea that would
be further explored in later centuries with reference to the idea of
fundamental states, i.e. cyclothymic, hyperthymic and dysthymic
(non disthemic) temperaments [7]. Arataeus also observed that
both mania and depression could occur simultaneously in the
same person, an observation according with early 20th century
nosological concepts such as ‘mixed states’ (Kraepelin, 1976) as
well as contemporary diagnostic categories and bipolar spectrum
concepts such as depressive mixed states (Benazzi 2005). Despite the
many striking conceptual comparisons, Arataeus’ notions of mania
and melancholia were much broader than our current nosologies,
arguably including schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorders, psychotic
depression and organic psychoses [4].
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After Arataeus
Over the intervening centuries many physicians have shared
Arataeus’ ideas about a close connection between mania and
melancholia. Examples include Paul of Aegina (625-690) and
Paracelsus (1493-1541). Notably, in 1567 Alexander of Tralles, a
Byzantine physician, acknowledged that cases of chronic melancholia
could be associated with recurrent, or periodic attacks of mania in a
cyclical manner. Alexander also goes on to suggest that the features
of mania and melancholia often intermix within a single episode/
attack [9]. Other physicians who maintained the manic–melancholic
association were Thomas Willis (1621–1675) and Giovanni Morgagni
(1628–1771). There were those however, who saw things differently.
Taking the opposing view are Timothie Bright (1550–1615), Robert
Burton and Phillipe Pinel (1745–1826).

Folie circulaire
This debate about the relationship between mania and depressive
states was finally resolved in the 19th century. Specifically, the
contemporary psychiatric conceptualisation of manic-depressive
illness is typically traced back to the 1850s. Marneros [8], describes
the concepts emerging out of this period as the “rebirth of bipolarity in
the modern era”. This rebirth began on January 31st 1854, when Jules
Baillarger described to the French Imperial Academy of Medicine a
biphasic mental illness causing recurrent oscillations between mania
and depression. To slightly complicate issues, two weeks later, on the
14th February 1854, Jean-Pierre Falret presented a description to the
Academy on what was essentially the same disorder. This illness was
designated folie circulaire (‘circular insanity’) by Falret, and folie à
double forme (‘dual-form insanity’) by Baillarger [10]. Baillarger made
accusations of plagiarism and contested the issue of precedence. To
vindicate himself of these accusations, Farlet produced a 14-sentence
long report on his folie circulaire that he had had published in the
Gazette des Hopitaux several years earlier, in 1851. Baillarger,
unconvinced, continued to reiterate and extend these accusations of
plagiarism until his death in 1890 [11].
Falret [12], went on to publish the more substantial description
of folie circulaire; “Mémoire sur la folie circulaire, forme de maladie
mentale caracterisée par la reproduction successive et régulière de
l’état maniaque, de l’état mélancholique, et d’un intervale lucide plus
ou moins prolongué”, an approximate English translation being;
“Circular insanity (is) a form of mental disease characterized by the
successive and uniform reproduction of the manic state, melancholic
state, and of a lucid interval of varying duration”.
On the issue of priority, Pichot argues that an objective analysis
of the printed material in relation to the two concepts demonstrates
that Baillarger’s accusations were unfounded. He suggests that the
two concepts, folie circulaire and folie à double forme, differ on
many important points, with Falret’s being closer to our present
conceptualisation. Many other commentators share this view
[4,5,9,10]. Baillarger’s folie à double forme concept assumed a
disease in which depression and mania change into one and other,
but the interval between transformations has no importance. Falret,
however, included a longitudinal perspective, which included the
possibility of a life-long disorder. Falret also considered the pattern of
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phases of mania and melancholia including the inter-phasic interval
(euthymia), thereby allowing episodes of mania and depression
separated by a long interval to be still considered folie circulaire [9].
Berrios [13], argues that the primacy debate is futile, pointing
out that there were several other French authors - contemporaries of
Baillarger and Falret - also writing along the same lines: Billod (‘folie
à double phase’, ‘dual-phase insanity’) and Legrand du Saulle (‘folie
alterne’, ‘alternating insanity’). However, despite these emerging 19th
century conceptualisations of a unitary biphasic disorder and their
spread across Europe and the US [8], there were still many clinicians
who continued to view mania and melancholia as invariably discrete,
separate entities. It took the pioneering work of Emil Kraepelin to
firmly establish the concept of manic-depressive insanity [5].

Manic depressive insanity
Emil Kraepelin was born in Neustrelitz Germany 1856.
Graduating in medical studies in 1878, he gravitated towards further
study and work in the field of psychiatry, initially travelling to Munich
to work with neurobiologist Bernhard Von Gudden; however,
his poor eyesight made microscope work difficult [6], and in 1882
Kraepelin left Munich and came to study under Flisig in Leipzig. This
did not work out and eventually Kraepelin was taken under the wing
of Wilhelm Wundt, working in Wundt’s psychological laboratory
in Leipzig. Wundt encouraged Kraepelin to write his ‘Compendium
of Psychiatry’, a publication that would eventually have a nearrevolutionary impact on the field of psychiatry [14].
By the second edition of the ‘Compendium’ (1887), Kraepelin
was suggesting that mental illnesses could be identified and organised
into a small, discrete number of categories, initially identifiable by
symptomatology. Kraepelin collected hundreds of case studies and
concluded that symptom groups followed characteristically different
courses, eventually arriving at three categories: dementia praecox,
paranoia and manic-depressive insanity.
By the sixth edition (1899), the term ‘manic depressive insanity’
(manisch-depressives irresein) had been born [6]. Kraepelin’s manicdepressive insanity evolved into a broad category that eventually
encompassed virtually all forms of melancholia and mania, including
what would today be considered unipolar depression. Kraepelin
essentially put folie circulaire and melancholia together to create his
unitary illness entity [8]. Kraepelin reasoned from clinical experience
that if a whole series of manic episodes could unexpectedly be
punctuated by a depressive episode, and thereby be considered
circular insanity, then this possibility should be extended to ‘periodic
melancholia’.
There were several key additions to the eighth edition of the
compendium specifically the idea of mixed and fundamental states.
Mixed states represent symptom mixtures, e.g. depression with flight
of ideas. Fundamental states are characterized as temperaments
or dispositions corresponding to less severe and more enduring
versions of the morbid affective states. Both the concepts of mixed
states and affective temperaments are central to what contemporary
theoreticians describe as the bipolar spectrum.
As influential, pervasive and durable as it has been, Kraepelin’s
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system of classification was also initially the target of a great deal
of criticism, much of which still reverberates within contemporary
nosological debates. Hoche [15] directed his critique at the system’s
assumption of a linear relationship between clinical symptoms and
localized brain lesions or micro-chemical alterations. Hoche argues
that essential psychotic symptomatology involved such things as
affect, will, and judgment, all of which engage widely distributed
brain areas, and therefore trying to map mental disease entities
to anatomical changes, would be futile [16]. Bonhoeffer [17] held
the view that aetiological differentiation was only possible at the
somatic or neurological level, but not at the level of psychological
symptomatology. Bonhoeffer uses the analogy with alcoholism,
illustrating how the same aetiology can give rise to varying disease
entities, e.g. delirium and hallucinosis, but also stressing the converse,
that is, that diverse aetiological factors can give rise to identical
clinical manifestations [16].
Kraepelin’s broad manic-depressive illness group also met with
some opposition in relation to its all-inclusiveness, for example in
Scandinavia, Lange, Christiansen, Pendersen and others continued to
work with periodic depression as a separate affective disorder [18-20].
Similarly, Bennon [21], argued for separating periodic depression
from manic-depressive illness; his call, however, was met with
little approval [4]. In Germany, too, Carl Wernicke challenged the
Kraepelinian view of manic-depressive illness inclusive of unipolar
depression and mania. Wernicke contended that illnesses where there
are only recurrences of depression or only recurrences of mania are
distinct from manic-depressive illness [4]. Likewise, Adolf Meyer
viewed the collapse of the various manifestations of mood disorders
into one group as a ‘startling condensation’ [22]. Of this monolithic
category Karl Jaspers writes:
“from time to time in psychiatry, there emerge diseases which
constantly enlarge themselves until they perish from their own
magnitude.” [23,6]
Despite some initial challenges, Kraepelin’s viewpoints and his
ultimately dichotomous taxonomy of psychotic illness gained wide
acceptance in a relatively short period of time, contributing to a
relative conceptual unification of European psychiatry [5]. Bentall
[21] suggests that,
“This ultimate triumph partly reflected the simplifying effect that
Kraepelin’s ideas had on the theory and practice of psychiatry.”
This observation is also reflected in Goodwin and Jamison’s [5],
attitude towards categorical, as opposed to dimensional approaches to
conceptualisation with categorical approaches viewed as intrinsically
easier to understand and manage statistically.
Post-Kraepelinian concepts of manic-depressive illness evolved
differently in Europe and the USA. European psychiatrists maintained
fidelity to a more traditionally-rooted medical disease model of
mental illness, whilst their North American counterparts were greatly
influenced by psychoanalytic perspectives, and came to place an
increasing emphasis on psychosocial factors in their understanding
of mental illness [5].
Adolf Meyer was instrumental in reshaping the conceptual
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framework adopted in North America [5]. The emergent Meyerian
framework viewed biological and genetic factors as underlying
vulnerabilities to specific psychosocial influences. This conceptual
shift is illustrated by the 1952 American Psychiatric Association
diagnostic manual’s (DSM-I) description not of manic-depressive
illness, but rather of manic-depressive reaction, conceptualised as a
subcategory of affective reactions [5].
In Europe, the work of Eugene Bleuler would extend, and to some
extent challenge, the Kraepelinian legacy. Bleuler, like Kraepelin,
drew on his observations of patient’s symptoms. Bleuler [24], came to
view Kraepelin’s term ‘dementia praecox’ (precocious dementia) as
misleading, given that the illness’ onset was not exclusively associated
with adolescence, nor did it invariably result in extreme mental
deterioration. Bleuler adopted the term schizophrenia, which better
describes what Bleuler saw as the core of the illness, specifically, a
separation between the functions of personality, thinking, memory
and perception [21]. Bleuler essentially broadened the Kraepelinian
boundaries in relation to schizophrenia/dementia praecox, since
his concept had room for a ‘simple schizophrenia’ (a form of
schizophrenia without delusions or hallucinations) and the seemingly
subclinical “latent schizophrenia” which cast the shadow of potential
case-ness over “… irritable, odd, moody, withdrawn or exaggeratedly
punctual people…” [24,21].
In 1924, Bleuler’s analysis of the ‘psychoses’ focused on the
relationship between the Kraepelinian conceptualisation of manicdepressive illness and Bleuler’s broader conceptualization of
schizophrenia. Ultimately, Bleuler came to view the demarcation
between these two categories of illness as wholly superficial and he
proposed a continuum between the two. For Bleuler, an individual
could be at different points along this continuum over the course
of their illness [21]. Kraepelin himself, in 1919, acknowledged that
features of the two illnesses were at times indistinguishable [25].
Bleuler’s concept placed manic-depressive illness on a continuum
with schizophrenia, the exact distance between the two constructs
being the degree of schizophrenic symptomatology. Bleuler identified
four “fundamental symptoms” of schizophrenia, sometimes known
in the English-language speaking world as the Bleuler’s four ‘A’s
(loosening of Associations, Ambivalence, Autism and inappropriate
Affect) [21]. For Bleuler, the presence of any of these symptoms
required a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Bleuler considered affective
symptomatology as non-specific, a diagnosis of manic depression
being made only after the exclusion of schizophrenia [21], concordant
with the dictum “even a trace of schizophrenia is schizophrenia” [26].
Bleuler also broadened the manic-depressive illness category
to include several subcategories and adopted the term ‘affective
illness’. Goodwin and Jamison [5], suggest that the influence of
Bleuler’s re-categorisation and conceptual broadening are evident
in the International Classifications of Diseases (8th and 9th editions)
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of the American
Psychiatric Association (DSM I and II), for instance, in the inclusion
of schizoaffective illness as a subtype of schizophrenia. They also
remark that Bleuler’s addition of subcategories of affective illnesses
anticipated the contemporary unipolar–bipolar subdivision of the
Manic-Depressive diagnostic group.
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The eventual subdivision of the Manic-Depressive diagnostic
group was also greatly influenced by the work of Leonhard, who
in 1957 proposed a classification system that made a distinction
between patients with a history of depression and mania and those
with a history of only depressive episodes [5]. Leonhard’s work had
its roots in the work of Wenicke who, as previously mentioned,
opposed Kraepelin’s inclusion of pure phasic mania and depression
in the manic-depressive illness construct. Taking this idea forward,
Leonhard termed those with a mixed history (episodes of mania and
depression) ‘bipolar’, and those with a history of depression or mania
only ‘monopolar’ [5]. Leonhard also noted that his bipolar patients
had a higher incidence of mania within their families compared to the
monopolar patients. This distinction was subsequently substantiated
by family history data [27-29]. These findings suggest that the most
prevalent affective disorder in the relatives of bipolar patients is
unipolar disorder followed by bipolar disorder, the rates of which are
two to three times greater than the rates of affective disorders in the
relatives of case controls. The rate of bipolar disorder in the probands
of unipolar patients is only marginally, and not always significantly,
higher than the rate found in the control group’s probands [5].
Angst (1966/1973) [27], offered further data supportive of
a bipolar–unipolar differentiation. Angst studied 326 patients
at the university hospital in Zurich between 1959 and 1963 and
drew attention to several differences between unipolar and bipolar
disorders; for example, he noted that for bipolar disorders the gender
ratio was fairly equal, whereas for unipolar disorders it was elevated
in females. Similarly, late onset depression was associated with
unipolar, but not bipolar disorders. With reference to Angst’s (1966)
publication, Pichot [30], asserts that the concept of bipolar disorder
was reborn, the first birth being attributed to fellow Frenchman
Falret, and surprisingly not Arataeus of Cappadocia.

Contemporary conceptualizations
Manic-depressive “illness” is currently conceived of as a recurrent
biphasic affective/mood disorder including episodes of hypomania,
mania and depression. Manic-depressive illness has dropped the
arguably metaphoric “illness” appendage, [31] and to distinguish it
from unipolar depression is today termed bipolar disorder or bipolar
affective disorder. Unlike dementia praecox, however, this disorder
appears to be fairly resilient to re-branding, and manic depression is
still a term in common use by the general population as well as many
professionals writing about the illness/disorder. Many of the large
self-help groups for people who have experienced bipolar disorder
still retain the name ‘manic depression’; the Manic-Depression
Fellowship, for instance, only recently chose to re-brand itself as
“MDF The Bipolar Organisation”. More than a quarter of a century
after the “illness” was recategorised and renamed bipolar disorder in
DSM-III [32], it is still commonly introduced to the public as ‘bipolar
disorder, formally known as manic-depressive illness’. Goodwin and
Jamison propose that manic-depressive illness represents the “…
magnification of common human experience” [5] and also suggest
that “few maladies in medical history have been represented by such
unvarying language” (1990 p.56) [5].
It is this magnification of common human emotional experiences
and the related descriptors ‘mania’ and ‘depression’ that arguably
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give the classical/Kraepelinian nomenclature ‘manic-depression’ its
durability. In contrast, the term ‘bipolar’ is descriptive of the disorders’
course but silent about the emotional content - the common human
experience.

Affectophilia or the bipolar spectrum?
Akiskal et al. [33], suggest that
“…the uncoupling of depressive disorders from the more strictly
defined bipolar disorders…left undefined many affective conditions
lying in the interface of unipolar and bipolar disorders.” (S7).
Akiskal et al. [33], contends that the post-Kraepelinian
conceptualisation of manic depressive illness has resulted in a
too narrowly defined bipolar category, and an implausibly broad
heterogeneous group of conditions labelled major depression [34]. Of
particular consequence is the definition of hypomania; for Akiskal,
et al. [33], the duration threshold of 4 days is too high. Cassano et al.
[35], used a two-day duration threshold for hypomania, as opposed to
the four days proposed within the DSM-IV. They found that patients
diagnosed according to the two-day duration had rates of familial
bipolarity statistically indistinguishable from bipolar I patients,
both of which were significantly higher than the rates found in
unipolar major depressive disorder patients. Angst and Gamma [36],
propose dropping the duration criteria altogether, with reference
to the occurrence of very brief episodes of hypomania observed in
adolescents with bipolar disorder.
Even leaving aside the duration threshold issue, hypomania, and
therefore bipolar II, are still particularly difficult to diagnose. The
under-diagnosis of hypomania, some argue, has important clinical
implications. Angst and Gamma [36], suggest that any failure to
diagnose hypomania leads to a false positive diagnosis of major
depressive disorder (MDD). Angst and Gamma maintain that this is
the case in up to 50% of MDD diagnoses.
In terms of improving the diagnostic criteria for hypomania,
both Akiskal et al. [33] and Angst and Gamma [36], argue for the
central importance of over-activity as obligatory criterion in the
diagnosis of hypomania, with Akiskal et al. placing it above changes
in mood in terms of its diagnostic importance. Angst and Gamma
[36], more conservatively suggest that either mood change (euphoria/
irritability) or over-activity should represent the obligatory criteria for
hypomania. A further difficulty, not addressed by lowering duration
thresholds or changing criteria, is the fact that hypomanic episodes
may not be particularly distressing for the individual and may be
experienced as ‘normal functioning’, ‘extreme wellness’, ‘intense
creative episodes’ etc. [37]. For this reason, detection may often have
to be retrospective, if not reconstructive, and reliant on third party
reports of the affective states and behaviours. This presents a situation
where identifying hypomania is reliant on the vagaries of memory
and/or whether or not significant others/carers etc. are available for
interview.
For Akiskal the splitting of bipolar and unipolar depression,
coupled with the conceptual and operational difficulties surrounding
hypomania, has left a group of disorders that are (a) ill-defined, (b)
undefined and (c) difficult to diagnose [7]. Cassano, et al. [35], share
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this view; the title of their special article summed up the situation as
“The bipolar spectrum: a clinical reality in search of diagnostic criteria
and an assessment methodology”. This view that much bipolar illness
goes unrecognised, perhaps buried within the ‘impossibly broad
major depressive disorder (MDD) group’, gives rise to questions of
quantification. Akiskal, et al. [33], assert that between 30 and 55% of
all affective disorders are found within the broader bipolar spectrum,
including many undefined ‘subthreshold’ expressions. As previously
mentioned, Angst and Gamma project that 50% of MDD cases are
actually undetected bipolar II. For Akiskal there is also bipolar III,
and IV.

10. Sedler M (1983) Falret’s discovery: the origin of the concept of bipolar
affective illness.Translated by MJ Sedler and Eric C Dessain. Am J Psychiatry
140: 1127-1133.

These undefined ‘subthreshold’ conditions are reported to
have adverse psychosocial consequences [7]. Such consequences
are arguably exacerbated by a lack of diagnostic and assessment
methodology [35], leading to delayed and under-diagnosis [38,39].

14. Bentall R (2003) Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature. London:
Penguin Group.

Is the future of bipolar disorder about greater diagnostic
granularity, a bipolar spectrum if you will? A more viable alternative
would be to take a symptom-centric approach [14]. This would involve
greater focus on the specific complaints associated with each case: for
example over activity (reward sensitivity), grandiosity, insomnia etc.
rather than the specific diagnosis assigned. In terms of research, at
least, this perspective this would prove more fruitful than comparing
groups of arguably heterogeneous patients on the assumption of a
shared diagnosis. If we are to make further progress in understanding
bipolarity and developing effective interventions, a symptom centric
approach makes more sense than increasing the number of diagnostic
categories.
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